TL;DR
A researcher demonstrated a proof-of-concept that uses Hinge photo uploads to carry encoded payloads and retrieve them via Hinge's public content API. The technique requires modifying the Android app to trust a user certificate and performing a man-in-the-middle (MITM) interception to harvest identifiers and headers needed to pull public photos.
What happened
A public writeup and accompanying repository show how Hinge can be repurposed to host command-and-control (C2) data. The researcher encoded a small compiled payload into an image using a Python encoder, uploaded it to a Hinge profile, and then retrieved the stored image via Hinge's public content API. Because Hinge serves profile photos through a predictable CDN URL and exposes content via an API endpoint, the encoded image can be downloaded and decoded to recover the payload. To capture the API headers and IDs required to retrieve another account's content, the author patched Hinge's Android APK to allow user-trusted certificates, installed the modified app, and used mitmproxy to inspect traffic. The post documents steps including extracting split APKs, embedding a network_security_config XML to trust user certificates, resigning apks, and reinstalling the bundle so MITM interception becomes possible.
Why it matters
- Public user photos and app endpoints can be used to carry arbitrary data if encoding and retrieval are possible.
- Lack of certificate pinning made it straightforward to intercept app traffic after modifying the app to trust user certificates.
- App bundle structure and network security configuration can be altered to enable MITM, which lowers barriers for researchers or attackers with device access.
- Demonstrates how mainstream consumer platforms can be repurposed as covert distribution channels for small payloads.
Key facts
- Repository with code and scripts referenced: https://github.com/matthewwiese/hinge-command-control-c2
- Account creation on Hinge requires a phone number; the author used Mint Mobile 7-day trial SIMs for research.
- Payload demonstrated was a toy C program compiled with gcc and encoded into an image via a Python script (enc.py).
- Hinge exposes public profile content via an API endpoint such as /content/v2/public?ids=<userId>, returning photo URLs and free-form answers.
- Photo CDN URLs follow a media.hingenexus.com pattern (example: https://media.hingenexus.com/image/upload/<cdnId>.jpg).
- The technique relied on modifying the Android app's network_security_config to include <certificates src="user"/>, enabling interception with a user-trusted certificate.
- Because Hinge is distributed as an Android App Bundle, the researcher pulled and repackaged base and split apks, removed signatures, injected the config, and re-signed with uber-apk-signer before reinstalling.
- mitmproxy was used to observe requests and extract headers (authorization, device identifiers, install id, app version) necessary for constructing API requests to fetch public content.
- The author notes Hinge does not qualify for HackerOne disclosure in this case because the method requires patching the app and performing MITM.
What to watch next
- Whether Hinge implements in-app measures such as certificate pinning or changes API access controls to reduce public content retrieval is not confirmed in the source.
- Any official response, remediation, or policy changes from Hinge regarding misuse of profile content for data transport is not confirmed in the source.
- Potential updates to the public repository or tooling used in the writeup that affect reproducibility or detection are not confirmed in the source.
Quick glossary
- Command and Control (C2) server: A system used by an operator or malware to send instructions and receive data from remote devices.
- Man-in-the-Middle (MITM): An interception technique where an attacker places themselves between two communicating parties to observe or modify traffic.
- Certificate pinning: A defense that makes an application accept only specific cryptographic certificates, limiting the effectiveness of MITM with forged or user-trusted certs.
- Android App Bundle / split APKs: Packaging format where an app is distributed as a base APK plus one or more split APKs optimized for device configurations.
- Steganography: The practice of hiding data within other files—such as embedding a payload inside an image—so the presence of the data is concealed.
Reader FAQ
Does this require a rooted phone?
The author describes avoiding root by patching and reinstalling the app on a standard Android device with developer options and USB debugging enabled.
Would Hinge consider this a valid HackerOne disclosure?
The writeup states this does not qualify for Hinge's HackerOne because the method relies on patching the app and performing MITM.
Are Hinge photos publicly accessible?
According to the writeup, photo metadata and CDN URLs can be retrieved via Hinge's public content API endpoint.
Is this technique already known to be used by real threat actors?
not confirmed in the source
Using Hinge as a Command & Control Server Disclaimer: This doesn't qualify for consideration through Hinge's Hacker One disclosure page since we need to patch the app and MITM it….
Sources
- Using Hinge as a Command and Control Server
- tcostam/awesome-command-control
- Inside Android Malware Development: Building a C2 …
- The Beginner's Guide to Command and Control Part 1
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